Software certi cation processes have become so intertwined with development processes that true product certi cation, which should demonstrate that the software will behave appropriately, is almost never employed. This de ciency calls for a new generation of certi cation processes. This paper presents a methodology for certifying software systems that will be employed in environments with high assurance requirements. Our methodology is independent of how the software was developed. Until software certi cation becomes a software-centered activity as opposed to a process-centered activity (e.g., CMM, TCSEC/Common Critieria, etc.), labeling software as \highly reliable," \high assurance," \high integrity," \safe," \se-cure" etc., is suspicious.
Introduction
Immature professions attempting accurate anomaly detection will likely su er from misclassi cation errors, particularly for those anomalies with low detectability. Take for instance the history of the early detectors that were used to classify human blood with the AIDS virus. 1989 was the year that the rst test for HIV-1 was licensed (even though the AIDS virus was rst identi ed in 1981). That test was not su cient, however, for the HIV-2 strain. The rst Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved test kit license for HIV-2 occurred in 1990, and it was not until 1991 that the FDA w as able to license a single test kit capable of testing for both forms of the virus. And in 1996, the FDA a p p r o ved the rst antigen test kit, carries an implicit goal of reuse (although that may frequently fail to occur), e.g., COTS functionality, it is not possible that the software publisher could have considered the Utopian behaviors unique to each target system when they wrote their software's speci cation. Ideally, for one-of-a-kind systems with custom software, the speci cation behavior should equal the Utopian behaviors, but errors such as missing requirements will cause this to not be true.
Because of how w e de ned Utopian behaviors, if the software always exhibits those behaviors, then system-level problems cannot occur. Here, the software is still of high assurance even if it violates the behaviors de ned in the software's speci cation. Thus it is preferable for the software to exhibit the Utopian behaviors instead of the speci cation's behaviors in cases where they disagree.
Software certi cation schemes that claim to be able to certify high assurance must be able to determine whether the software can exhibit undesirable system-de ned behaviors. The problem, however, is that speci cation-de ned software behaviors may con ict with the Utopian \system-level" behaviors. Our certi cation methodology will address this discrepancy.
The High-Assurance Pipeline
We are now ready to walk the reader through our high assurance certi cation model (See Figure 1 ). Note that although we order the certi cation processes in Figure 1 , in practice, there may be reasons to iterate or change the ordering of these pipes.
In our model, software certi cation processes will be independent of the processes employed in the \Requirements and Speci cation" and \Develop Software" pipes. Note however that the end-result of certi cation will de nitely depend on the techniques used within the \Develop Software" phase of the life-cycle (as well as depend on those techniques being applied performed.) Before unveiling the model, we will rst discuss the initial processes that must be performed before certi cation begins.
Pipe 1 Requirements and Speci cations
In school, budding software engineers are taught to write their requirements in a concise, unambiguous, and complete manner. Software engineers are taught that if they do not de ne what they want the software to do, their software is unlikely to do it. De ning requirements is an exercise that occurs in the rst pipe of the pipeline and is needed before software development can begin.
But de ning what we w ant the software to do is not su cient for high assurance. Figure 1 The high-assurance certi cation pipe that the software could exhibit that are not ideal but can be tolerated by the system and do not impact negatively on the assurance a orded by the software. Since defect-free software is, in general, an oxymoron, it is prudent t o s u c c u m b to certain problems while concentrating e ort on thwarting those problems that are totally unacceptable. An instantiation of an Utopian software behavior is de ned as a three-tuple (a software input vector, the desired software output or range of acceptable software output values, and the state of the system or environment at the time when this input is executed). For a xed software input, many di erent system states might be possible, and hence there could be ranges of output values that would be acceptable. Or for a xed software input, there might be only one unique system state associated with it yet there might be a range of acceptable output values or possibly only one speci c output that could be tolerated by the system. Software speci cations, particularly for reusable software, may only consider two parts of the three-tuple (a software input vector and the correct software output or a range of acceptable output values).
For example, suppose that a speci cation de nes the following input/output tuple (1,2). Suppose further that this is acceptable only if the system is in state A. For system state B, the software speci cation needs to require (1, 6) . Since the speci cation de ned (1, 2) and assuming that the software is deterministic and correct, the state (1,6,B) is not possible only the states (1,2,A) and (1,2,B) are.
We are now ready to illustrate this principle more generally. Figure 2 (A) shows two spaces D is the space of desirable (correct) software output behaviors given the software's inputs, and U is the space of undesirable (incorrect) behaviors. Here, the spaces in Figure   2 (A) ignore the state of the target environment that the software will operate in. Software quality i s de ned in Figure 2 (A) as if the software were a stand-alone entity. To address the de ciency of ignoring system state, Figure 2 (B) rede nes four di erent Some of the failures de ned in U in Figure 2 (A) appear as successes in D' because their impact to the system was inconsequential and could betolerated. Thus once system state is considered during software certi cation, software outputs de ned as failures (when state was not considered) may nd themselves rede ned as successes or vice versa. Certifying high assurance software, then, requires a convincing argument that the behav-iors in (U U') cannot occur. Thus for high assurance certi cation, it is necessary to have access to de nitions for D, D', U, and U'.
Pipe 2 Design for High Assurance
The second pipe in Figure 1 builds software. The second pipe contains a cornucopia of processes for transforming software requirements into code. This pipe contains processes such as CASE tools, compilers, debuggers, design paradigms (e.g., Bertrand Meyer's Designby-Contract, defensive programming, etc.). Because this pipe contains the more creative and enjoyable tasks associated with software engineering, this pipe usually receives more attention than the other two. But since this pipe is not the focus of this paper, we will quickly move into discussing the third pipe.
Pipe 3 Certi cation Through Stress
The processes in the \Develop Software" pipe are necessary to achieve high quality code, but they do not guarantee that high quality software will result. And simply employing speci c bestpractices in the \Develop Software" pipe is not su cient to trust the code either. This section is devoted to three assurance certi cation processes that observe how frequently behaviors in (U U') manifest themselves. The processes that will be recommended here are radically di erent than those that the current state-of-the-practice calls for. Current certi cation practice is highly process-oriented 5, 1]. It usually requires processes in the rst two pipes such as criticality analysis, failure modes and e ect analysis, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, Markov modeling, formal methods, etc. In contrast, our productoriented certi cation scheme contains procedures that only serve to exercise and stress the software. Note that we are not suggesting replacing design assurance techniques or any other processes in the \Develop Software" pipe. We are only arguing that certi cation must be independent of design assurance.
Our scheme will determine whether to grant high assurance certi cation without regards for what occurred in the rst two pipes, with one exception being that we need information concerning (D D'). No other information from the rst two pipes will beconsidered by our certi cation methodology.
Our goal is simple justi able high assurance certi cation based on demonstrated software behavior. For this, three processes will be used 1. Desirable behavior testing Demonstration that under operational input scenarios, the software performs only those environment-based behaviors contained in (D D').
2. Abnormal testing Demonstration that under abnormal input scenarios, the software performs only those environment-based behaviors contained in (D D'). 3 . Fault injection Demonstration that failures of any subsystem, whether hardware or other software cannot cause the software to behave in a manner that contradicts those environment-based behaviors contained in (D D').
Desirable behavior testing
Our rst certi cation process is \desirable behavior testing." Desirable behavior testing (dbt) c hecks to see if the software exhibits behaviors in (U U'), and if so, counts those as software failures. Output behaviors in (D D') are counted as successes. In comparison, reliability testing seeks to ensure that the software performs correctly according to the correct behaviors de ned in the requirements. 3 Existing certi cation standards often recommend that reliability testing be performed 3]. But note that dbt is a slight t wist on traditional reliability testing all behaviors de ned in Figure 2 (B) are de ned with respect to the system, and not simply based on (input, output) pairs as illustrated in Figure 2 (B). Thus reliability testing by the software publisher (or even an independent third-party certi cation laboratory) cannot be equivalent to a system's stake-holders performing dbt.
Like reliability testing, desirable behavior testing uses inputs selected at random from the \operational pro le." The operational pro le for the software re ects the operational pro le of the target environment that the software will bea part of. An operational pro le describes the probability t h a t e a c h input will be selected when the software is deployed 12]. dbt provides an analysis of how w ell-behaved the code is when it is executing in operational modes. So for example, if an input value of '100' to the software is likely to occur in the software's target environment, dbt would execute the software using '100' with appropriate system states and check its output.
As an actual example of the value of considering the system state when selecting test cases, consider the Ariane 5 rocket disaster 10]. In this failure, software was reused from the Ariane 4 rocket and embedded into the di erent trajectory environment of the Ariane 5. The software was reliable in the Ariane 4 environment ( t h us the software exhibited behaviors consistent with those in (D D') ). The software failed, however, when put into the Ariane 5 environment, because (D D') was di erent for Ariane 5 than for Ariane 4. Some of those membersfrom Ariane 4's (D D') now found themselves in Ariane 5's (U U').
Abnormal testing
After dbt is performed, the second certi cation process is abnormal testing. Abnormal testing employs infrequent, rare test cases.
Rare test cases have l o w likelihoods of being selected according to the operational pro le, but they are still possible candidates for execution after the software is released. Like desirable behavior testing, abnormal testing counts how many software outputs are members of (D D').
Abnormal testing leverages the information that de nes the operational pro le. Abnormal testing inverts the operational pro le (as de ned in 11]) and then performs the same processes as dbt. Just as with dbt, the operational pro le used for the inversion must reect the operational environment if the system that the software is a part of. This provides an analysis of how well-behaved the code is when it is executing in the more unlikely input modes. So for example, if an input value of '1' is unlikely in the target environment y et still possible, abnormal testing would force the software to receive a '1' (with appropriate system states de ned in Figure 2(B) ) and then observe whether any outputs satisfy those behaviors in (D D').
One other type of abnormal testing involves skewing the operational pro le such that greater weight is given to (input, system states) pairs for which failure occurring would result in grievous system consequences. In certain cases, this consequence-based approach to test case generation will beidentical to what we just de ned as beingabnormal testing, but more often, this variant on abnormal testing will allow us to try test inputs that hone in to exercise the software's more critical tasks. This form of abnormal testing may be di cult in practice, however, because the specialized test case generation functions needed may not beknown.
In summary, abnormal testing uses pro le-skewing techniques which can provide insight into how successful the early life-cycle processes were at developing well-behaved code under unusual circumstances. Because unusual inputs may be ignored during the publisher's testing as well as design, we consider it pivotal to our methodology.
Fault injection
After abnormal testing is completed, the third and nal certi cation process is fault injection. Fault injection employs the same procedures already described in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 but adds a twist it uses speci c \fault class" rules to mangle the internal states that are created as the software executes. This is particularly important for high availability systems that must function even if their input states are corrupted.
Fault injection observes whether the software still produces outputs consistent with (D D') even though its internal or input states were corrupted. So while the software executes under uncorrupted operational and abnormal inputs, fault injection corrupts states and observes whether the software still behaves appropriately. If so, the software is fault-tolerant and has good recoverability. The di erence between fault injection and abnormal testing and dbt is that fault injection tests the tolerance of the software to failures of system's subcomponents including external hardware, other software functionality than that being certi ed, and human user errors, meanwhile observing whether the software's outputs satisfy (D D').
Note that there will be situations where it is acceptable if the software does not behave i n a manner consistent w i t h ( D D') after fault injection is applied. Speci cally, the situation where it can beshown that the corrupted states employed during fault injection were such that there are no circumstances by which those mangled states could manifest themselves in \real-life." For each observed behavior that is not in (D D'), if we can mitigate the possibility o f i t e v er occurring naturally, t h e n w e ignore the fact that an undesirable behavior was observed, i.e., we will not hold this fact against the software when deciding whether certi cation is warranted. The goal, obviously, is to attempt to only employ corrupt states that are reasonable failure modes for the subsystems that the software under certi cation interacts with. But this cannot always beassumed.
Note that of the three processes in the certi cation pipe, software fault injection is the most intensive and most expensive to perform. It is also the one that is the most likely to ferret out unknown behaviors that are outside of (D D'). This is because fault injection asks questions about the software's behavior that are much more probing than those asked by abnormal testing or dbt.
To Grant Certi cation or Not
We have recommended three processes for the high assurance certi cation pipe. To be certi ed, software should exhibit only those behaviors in (D D') during dbt, abnormal testing, and fault injection (recall that we ignore those violations of (D D') that we can mitigated away). We do not claim that our 3-part approach is fully su cient. Additional certi cation technologies are needed. We d o c l a i m , h o wever, that given existing technologies, the ones that we h a ve included are necessary. And we recognize that other testing and quality assessment analyses exist that could be used as supporting evidence in favor of granting certi cation or they might e v en subsume the processes discussed here.
The immediate question that arises concerns how much certi cation e ort should be allocated to each of the three processes. For example, if only one system-level test case were used during each process, and all outputs satis ed (D D'), would we bewilling to grant certi cation? Of course not! But other than knowing an absurdity like t h i s when we see it, it is not easy to select a single numberas the required level of certi cation e ort which is su cient for all programs. Also, it might make sense to vary the level of e ort between the di erent procedures, e.g., dbt might employ twice as many test cases as abnormal testing since few rare test cases might e x i s t .
In summary, system stake-holders must take responsibility f o r decisions concerning how much e ort to expend. After all, they carry to liability for the system and the software. If they pick an absurdly low value to reduce costs, their pocketbooks may bearthe brunt of their negligence. Alternatively, if certi cation laboratories are employed to perform software certi cation, they too must take responsibility for decisions concerning how much e ort to expend. It is their stamp of approval that goes onto the software. If they pick an absurdly low value to reduce costs, the world will quickly learn what their seal of approval is worth after the rst catastrophe is reported.
Approach Validation
To s h o w that our 3-part certi cation process is well-researched, we will employ a c o m bination of analytical and empirical results. Also, where appropriate, we will show h o w our approach aligns with published statements from high-assurance software experts.
To begin, consider the fault injection process. In numerous experiments, the value of employing fault injection to thwart out undesirable behavior has beenshown. Voas analytically showed how fault injection could have warned of the problems that occurred to the Therac-25 and Ariane-5 before those systems were deployed 13]. Voas et al. demonstrated how fault injection detected a serious aw in the safety-monitoring routine of a nuclear control application 2]. The fault had not been discovered by any other V&V technique, even though many di erent testing techniques had been applied of a period of many years. In fact, that error made that part of the safety-monitoring software useless. In 4], similar results discussed how fault injection had detected an improperly placed safety-monitoring assertion that was needed to keep a voltage spike from occurring in a surgical device (UVA's Prototype Magneto Stereotaxis System). That same paper also described how fault injection had localized multiple fault-tolerance problems in the new subway c o n trol system. After localization, the developer corrected the potential hazards using a variety of di erent error recovery mechanisms.
Fault injection has also shown amazing abilities to detect the potential for bu er over ows in security-critical systems. Ghosh et. al. 7] reported successful results from analyzing the vulnerability of security-critical software applications to malicious threats and anomalous events using fault injection. Their work was based on the well-understood premise that a large proportion of security violations result from errors in software source code and con guration. Their methodology employed software fault injection to force anomalous program states during the execution of software and observes their corresponding e ects on system security. In 6], Ghosh et. al. presented a more specialized fault injection technique for analyzing security-critical software for vulnerability t o bu er overrun attacks. This technique dynamically analyzed software source code to determine the potential to successfully overrun program bu ers in order to execute arbitrary system commands. Their fault injection algorithm inserted malicious strings into potentially vulnerable bu ers during execution. If the bu er overrun attack was successful, arbitrary malicious code could beexecuted at the whim of the attacker on the host system.
With respect to the abnormal testing process, 4] also showed how inverted operational pro les are an ideal way to test for the e ects of unlikely input events. That experiment involved the yawdamp.c software function from an avionics simulation. The experiment revealed divergent safety behaviors between when the code's operational pro le was inverted and when it was not.
Many others have noted the potential for hazards from oddevents. In Leveson's book on page 60, she states 9] \Usually, the most likely hazards are controlled, but hazards with high severity and (assumed) low probability are dismissed as not worth investing resources to prevent ..."
Abnormal testing can provide information concerning whether such hazards should be ignored or not. And on page 493 of Leveson's book 9], she recommends that test cases are used that account for \boundary conditions" and \incorrect and unexpected inputs and input sequences and timing (minimum, maximum, and outside the expected range)". Herb Hecht echos a similar message from his years testing NASA Shuttle software 8]. He states \Where the nature of a program demands extremely high reliability, it appears therefore that the test scenario should include a substantial number of case that simulate multiple (at least two) rare conditions."
Hecht collected evidence showing that single rare conditions were di cult to detect via testing and multiple rare conditions were even harder. These are precisely the types of events that must be mitigated during high assurance certi cation. Abnormal testing provides that capability in our high-assurance methodology. dbt is a necessary process because high-assurance is a system-level property, not softwarelevel property alone. It is foolish to believe that correct software cannot cause terrible system-level damage. On page 495 of Leveson's book 9], she states \Reliability assessment o f s o f t ware does not assess safety..... Accidents are rarely the result of component failure of a type that would beeasy to predict through such reliability testing. Rather, the events leading to an accident are usually a complex combination of equipment failure, faulty maintenance, instrumentation and control problems, management errors, design errors, and operator errors."
This explains why our certi cation model employs the system perspective on software \bad-ness" (U U') instead of B. B only considers the software speci cation's de nition of \badness", and that fails to account for many of the problems that can cause disaster. To our knowledge, dbt is the rst black-box software testing technique that employs the software's operational pro le but whose oracle is based on the high-assurance requirements of the system (and not necessarily of the software). Although we have not yet experimented with dbt yet, it does align with the common wisdom on best testing practices.
Summary
We a c knowledge that in order to rank development organizations according to their technical sophistication, it is reasonable to grade them according to their processes and corporate infrastructure. It is equally reasonable to grade them on the historical success of their previous products (even though to our knowledge this is less frequently done except at the contractual level.) Certifying software products is di erent, however, than certifying the publishers.
Before we close, we need to highlight a subtle point that has been carried through the paper. Each certi cation process was a function of the environment's operational pro le, not the assumed pro le by the software's publisher. Thus it is possible that a program could receive high assurance certi cation for one pro le while failing to receive it for another. This makes sense. High assurance software certi cation must betied to speci c system pro les it does not make sense to grant 'carte blanche' high assurance certi cates because with the exception of trivial systems, it cannot be justi ed.
Recognize that this \limited claims" approach is not unusual in other disciplines. The US Foodand Drug Administration approves drugs for speci c sets of circumstances. Drug A may be approved for speci c diseases or speci c age groups (like for adults and not children), but not approved for other circumstances. Given that software is discrete and highly unpredictable, and given that our profession is still in its infancy, it is prudent to boundexpectations to only those that are known to be true.
Our perspective on software certi cation di ers with many of our peers. We believe that certi cation must be independent o f h o w the software was developed. We c o n tend that if an accurate system pro le cannot be found, high assurance certi cation for the software cannot be justi ed. Further, we contend that high assurance certi cation should not be granted if attempts were not made to de ne the undesirable behavior space with respect to system state. We accept that this behavior space can never be fully de ned, and in some cases will beincorrectly de ned, leading to improper certi cation decisions. But it is time that this space start receiving attention early in the software life-cycle. The more we practice de ning it, the betterwe will get at de ning it.
And nally, a certi cate designating that a program has attained the level of assurance known as \high" using our methodology does not also guarantee that the program will always bewell-behaved. Risk is still incurred. Although disheartening, we must accept that there will always bea non-zero probability that the software has poorer quality than we believe. The goal, then, is to seek product-oriented quality measures that reduce this probability. Our certi cation \endurance course" (that makes the software jump through di cult hurdles) is one step in that direction.
